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Note 
CROSSPOLLINATION OF SAME-SEX PARENTAL RIGHTS 
POST-DOMA:  THE SUBTLE SOLUTION 
DAVE WOODS 
In the summer of 2013, the United States Supreme Court, to great 
fanfare, struck down the central provision of the seventeen-year-old 
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”).  Yet a second DOMA provision, 
denying full faith and credit for same-sex marriages, was not overturned, 
meaning individual states remain free to ban and refuse recognition for 
same-sex unions.  As a result, the parental rights of same-sex spouses who 
move into anti-marriage-equality states may be imperiled.  This Note 
argues, however, that even when same-sex marriages are not supported 
within a jurisdiction, parental rights emanating from those marriages will 
be supported.   
Surveying case law from states across the country to show that 
statutory and common-law mechanisms work to preserve the parental 
rights and responsibilities of members of same-sex unions, this Note goes 
on to suggest that broad societal recognition of children’s need for parents 
outweighs state-by-state positions on gay marriage.  Hence, same-sex civil 
rights are subtly being advanced nationwide by the day-to-day decisions of 
state family courts.  A migration of same-sex family law rights from 
marriage-equality states into mini-DOMA states appears to be under way, 
a process that gay-rights advocates can encourage as a subtle solution to 
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CROSSPOLLINATION OF SAME-SEX PARENTAL RIGHTS 
POST-DOMA:  THE SUBTLE SOLUTION 
  DAVE WOODS* 
“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try 
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.” 
—Justice Louis D. Brandeis1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor2 was 
celebrated by progressive legal activists for its invalidation of the Defense 
of Marriage Act (“DOMA”).3  Crucially, the Windsor Court declared 
section 3 of that Act, which for nearly seventeen years had precluded 
federal recognition of gay marriage,4 to be unconstitutional.5  Yet section 2 
of the Act, which enshrined state choice-of-law treatment for same-sex 
relationships,6 remains in effect.7  In line with that section, a plethora of 
states have enacted so-called “mini-DOMAs,” state statutes and/or 
constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex marriages and refusing to 
honor such marriages conducted in other states.8  Prior to Windsor, thirty-
five states banned same-sex marriage—three by constitutional amendment, 
five by state law, and twenty-seven by both.9  Post-Windsor, two states, 
                                                                                                                          
* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2015; University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, M.S. 2010; Defense Language Institute, A.A. 2005; Quinnipiac University, M.A.T. 1998, 
B.A. 1996.  My sincere thanks to Professor Marcia Canavan for inspiring and guiding this Note and to 
Jean M. Doss for teaching me how real social progress occurs. 
1 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
2 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
3 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695–96; see also Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 
Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012)). 
4 See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (restricting federal recognition of marriage to unions of one woman and one 
man), invalidated by Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
5 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695–96. 
6 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (denying full-faith-and-credit interstate treatment for “a relationship 
between persons of the same sex”). 
7 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682–83. 
8 See Andrew Koppelman, The Difference the Mini-DOMAs Make, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 265, 
265–68 (2007) (reviewing the history of mini-DOMAs and delineating their varieties). 
9 See Fernanda Santos, New Mexico Justices to Rule on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 
2013, at A14 (confirming that thirty-five states banned same-sex marriage as of October 2013, before 
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Illinois and Hawai‘i, have adopted gay marriage legislatively,10 and one 
state, New Mexico, has adopted it by judicial fiat,11 leaving thirty-three 
states that continue to mount mini-DOMA regimes.12  
The ongoing result of these mini-DOMAs is that same-sex couples, 
including those legally married in any of the seventeen states that permit 
gay marriages, may not be able to receive the legal benefits of marriage if 
they enter mini-DOMA jurisdictions.13  To defenders of traditional 
marriage, this disparity reflects the very state individuality evoked in the 
Brandeis epigraph, with local populations properly defining their own civil 
rights and procedures.14  For marriage-equality activists, the bifurcated 
situation hearkens back to a Dred Scott-like environment of progressive 
and recalcitrant regions in mutual strife.15  For lesbian/gay/ 
                                                                                                                          
legalization by New Mexico, Hawai‘i, and Illinois); see also Gay Marriage, PROCON.ORG, 
http://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=004857 (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) 
(showing same-sex-marriage policy statuses of all fifty states and effective dates of relevant laws). 
10 See Derrick DePledge, Judge’s Decision Clears Way for Gay Marriages, HONOLULU STAR-
ADVERTISER, Nov. 15, 2013, at A1 (chronicling the passage of a marriage-equality law in Hawai‘i and 
a critical subsequent state court’s ruling that the new law did not violate a 1998 marriage-defining 
amendment to the Hawai‘i constitution); Monique Garcia & Ray Long, Lawmakers Affirm Gays’ Right 
to Wed: Illinois Is Set to Join 14 Other States, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 6, 2013, at 1 (announcing the repeal of 
Illinois’ mini-DOMA law despite a “year in which prospects for gay marriage often were dim”).  
Hawai‘i had briefly allowed same-sex marriage in the window between December 1996 and December 
1999, before the passage of a constitutional amendment re-validated a previously struck-down 
marriage-limiting statute.  See Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21–22 (Haw. 
Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) (declaring denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples a violation of Hawai‘i 
Constitution’s equal protection clause); Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1076 (D. Haw. 
2012) (tracing the history of same-sex marriage in Hawai‘i, including an “unpublished summary 
disposition” from the state supreme court holding that the 1998 amendment rendered challenges to state 
same-sex marriage restrictions “moot”). 
11 When the federal DOMA fell, New Mexico had neither approved nor banned same-sex 
marriage, the only state not to have taken a position.  See Santos, supra note 9 (describing same-sex 
matrimony as an issue the New Mexico legislature “failed to resolve” and the governor “avoided”).  
The New Mexico Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage on December 19, 2013, in a unanimous 
ruling.  Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013); see also Cindy Carcamo, New Mexico Joins 16 
States, D.C. to Make Same-Sex Marriage Legal, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 20, 2013, at A3 
(explaining the ruling and its effects).  
12 See Masuma Ahuja & Emily Chow, Same-Sex Marriage Status in the U.S., WASH. POST POL., 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/same-sex-marriage/ (last visited Mar. 13, 
2014) (tracking ongoing changes in same-sex marriage and union policy in the United States).  The 
numbers and state statuses provided in this Note are accurate at the time of its publication; online 
sources such as Ahuja & Chow’s provide routinely updated information as the legal landscape changes. 
13 Koppelman, supra note 8, at 265–66. 
14 See Toni Lester, Adam and Steve vs. Adam and Eve: Will the New Supreme Court Grant Gays 
the Right to Marry?, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 253, 278 (2006) (discussing gay marriage 
as a moral issue that DOMA supporters believe demands state-by-state regulation under the Tenth 
Amendment). 
15 See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 394 (1857) (ruling that one state’s elevating 
a person’s status does not “entitle him to . . . any of the privileges and immunities of a citizen in 
another state”), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Robert A. 
Burt, Overruling Dred Scott: The Case for Same-Sex Marriage, 17 WIDENER L.J. 73, 90 (2007) 
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bisexual/transsexual (“LGBT”) activists, then, securing and enjoying the 
privileges of marriage irrespective of state borders may be the next legal 
hurdle.  Yet even as that campaign accelerates, there is reason to believe 
that in the battle over one of the most crucial legal effects of marriage—its 
role in child-custody and child-support rights and obligations—same-sex-
marriage proponents are already winning.   
This Note argues that even in a mini-DOMA state, child-custody or     
-support doctrines and statutory provisions that empower same-sex 
partners may already be firmly in place.  Part II of the Note will trace the 
history of child rearing as a court-recognized right and benefit of marriage.  
Part III will demonstrate that, historically, doctrines based on 
psychological or implied parentage and/or parentage ascertained by 
equitable or promissory estoppel may provide a means for LGBT 
parents—particularly those emerging from divorces and break-ups—to 
maintain their parental rights, even without access to the marriage 
institution.  Part IV will examine a federal statute, the Parental Kidnapping 
Prevention Act16 (“PKPA”), which exists to force states to grant one 
another full faith and credit for child-support and -visitation orders.  Part V 
will apply the implied-parentage and PKPA dynamics in analyzing three 
geographically and culturally disparate mini-DOMA exemplar states—
Illinois, Montana, and Alabama—to examine their evolving positions on 
the parental rights of members of same-sex couples.  Finally, Part VI will 
conclude that, ironically, there may be rights derived from same-sex 
marriages that state statutory and common law protect even in states that 
explicitly refuse to countenance same-sex unions.  It will suggest that the 
crosspollination of same-sex, family law rights from marriage-equality 
states into mini-DOMA states is well under way and should be fostered by 
gay-rights advocates as a subtle solution to the continuing presence of anti-
LGBT policy in the majority of U.S. jurisdictions. 
II.  MARRIAGE AND THE RIGHT TO PRODUCE AND RAISE CHILDREN 
Bringing forth children and holding them out to the community as 
one’s own has long been a key benefit and oft-repeated underpinning of 
state-sanctioned marriage.  In fact, courts have often seemed eager to say 
that procreation is the ab initio reason that marriage exists.17  As far back 
                                                                                                                          
(considering the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments’ effects on the Dred Scott era and 
championing their similar application to same-sex issues today). 
16 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2012). 
17 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (exalting procreation as the key 
underpinning of marriage by stating that “a decision to marry and raise [a] child in a traditional family 
setting must receive equivalent protection” to abortion rights); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 
(1967) (indicating that “[m]arriage is . . . fundamental to our very existence and survival”). 
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as the 1888 case of Maynard v. Hill,18 the United States Supreme Court 
stated that the “public is deeply interested” in marriage, as it forms the 
“foundation of the family.”19  The Maynard Court concluded that without 
marriage there “would be neither civilization nor progress.”20  The 
implication that marriage is essential to procreation and survival21 was 
even more evident half a century later when the Supreme Court declared, 
“Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and 
survival of the race.”22  Finally, over thirty years later, the Court held that 
the “decision to marry and raise [a] child in a traditional family setting 
must receive equivalent protection” to the privacy rights undergirding 
abortion.23   
This seminal jurisprudence on marriage and the family survives in the 
courts deciding today’s gay-marriage controversies.  Upholding 
Nebraska’s constitutional mini-DOMA, for example, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found “steering heterosexual 
procreation into marriage” to be a purpose so valid that it “negate[d] any 
suspicion that the supporters of [the mini-DOMA] were motivated solely 
by a desire to punish disadvantaged groups.”24  The Texas Court of 
Appeals found that marriage laws favoring traditional couples did not 
violate equal protection as heterosexuals alone possessed the “natural 
ability to procreate.”25  Similarly, in attempting to restrict marriage to 
“male-female couples”26 and exorcise the judiciary’s ability to change that 
definition, the Hawai‘i legislature passed a law in 1994 stating that the 
state’s marriage licenses were “intended to foster and protect the 
propagation of the human race through male-female marriages.”27  Justice 
Scalia even specified his concern over the “consequences of raising a child 
in a single-sex family” during oral arguments in Hollingsworth v. Perry,28 
the gay-marriage case that accompanied Windsor during the 2013 term. 
The link between marriage and children has quite frequently been 
                                                                                                                          
18 125 U.S. 190 (1888). 
19 Id. at 211.  In Loving v. Virginia, the Court cited Maynard to conclude that marriage was too 
vital and fundamental a right to be frustrated by racial discrimination.  388 U.S. at 12. 
20 125 U.S. at 211. 
21 See, e.g., Maggie Gallagher, Does Sex Make Babies? Marriage, Same-Sex Marriage and Legal 
Justifications for the Regulation of Intimacy in a Post-Lawrence World, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 447, 
451 (2004) (citing the Maynard Court’s words as making the connection between marriage and 
procreation “axiomatic”). 
22 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
23 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978). 
24 Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 869 (8th Cir. 2006). 
25 In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 674 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010). 
26 A Bill for an Act Relating to Marriage, 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws 217, repealed by Hawaii 
Marriage Equality Act of 2013. 
27 Id. at 529. 
28 Oral Argument at 22:05, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), 
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_12_144. 
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asserted as an argument against legalized same-sex unions.  Campaigning 
in 2006 for a constitutional DOMA on the federal level, President George 
W. Bush declared that “changing the definition of marriage would 
undermine the family structure.”29  In the same year, then Senate majority 
leader Bill Frist argued that “[m]arriage between one man and one woman 
does a better job protecting children, better than any other institution 
humankind has devised.”30  The president of the Marriage Law 
Foundation, a traditional-marriage-defense group formed on the one-year 
anniversary of Massachusetts’ adoption of same-sex marriage in 2003,31 
wrote in 2008 that “married mother-father child-rearing [is the] mode that 
indisputably correlates with the optimal outcomes” for children and 
society.32 
Indeed, DOMA itself was ostensibly engendered by precisely such 
concerns.  A 1996 House of Representatives committee report on House 
Resolution 3396, which was soon to be cast into law as DOMA, explains 
that society has “an interest in maintaining and protecting the institution of 
heterosexual marriage because it has a deep and abiding interest in 
encouraging responsible procreation and child-rearing.”33  Not to be 
misread, the report implores that “it is not the mere presence of love that 
explains marriage” but the fact that “marriage is a relationship within 
which the community socially approves and encourages sexual intercourse 
and the birth of children.”34  DOMA was born—as, no doubt, were the 
mini-DOMAs—out of the deep legal and social connections between 
parental rights and the institution of marriage.  
Hence, one reason that homosexual citizens might seek to challenge 
traditional marriage restrictions is to secure the right to bring forth and 
raise children.  Reviewing the long-standing legal, political, and social 
identification of child-rearing and marriage, a corollary principle seems to 
exist: one who secures the right to bring forth and raise children also gains 
a key portion of the right to marry. 
III.  IMPLIED PARENTAGE AND ESTOPPEL IN CHILD CUSTODY 
The preceding Part shows that jurists, politicians, and commentators 
have an affinity for clear biological parent-child relationships.  The 
elegance in child-custody law derived from such relationships cannot be 
                                                                                                                          
29 Deb Riechmann, Bush Pushes Amendment Banning Gay Marriage: Has Little Chance to Pass, 
but Will Be Used to Rally Conservatives, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 5, 2006, at 23. 
30 Laurie Kellman, Bush Steps Up Same-Sex Fight, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), June 6, 2006, at A14. 
31 About the Foundation, MARRIAGE L. FOUND., http://www.marriagelawfoundation. 
org/board.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2014). 
32 Monte Neil Stewart, Marriage Facts, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 313, 352 (2008). 
33 H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 13 (1996). 
34 Id. at 13–14. 
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denied: he or she who physically creates children is responsible for them 
and has fundamental rights over them.  While same-sex marriage and 
parenting may appear to upend this traditional biology-based doctrine, 
plunging family law into chaos, a measured review of case law from across 
the country suggests that since long before the controversies of the DOMA 
era, biology has not been a controlling, or even necessary, substructure of 
child-custody jurisprudence.  Despite the vehement legal and political 
defenses of marriage as a vehicle for creating children, child custody has 
been no more reserved for married people than has procreation itself.  
Since gay citizens in mini-DOMA states cannot obtain parental rights 
through marriage or, often, adoption,35 courts must grapple with the issue 
of whether and how to assign parentage over children emerging from 
same-sex households.  This problem may seem novel to some, but the 
essentials of the issue existed at least as far back as the emergence of 
artificial-insemination technology in the late nineteenth century.36  By the 
early 1950s, babies had been artificially conceived and delivered using the 
frozen sperm of deceased fathers, inevitably raising parentage questions.37  
Since the advent of such possibilities, courts have routinely had to fashion 
parentage doctrines without traditional biological or statutory guideposts 
directing them.  In 1963, for example, Stanley Gursky, a New York 
husband divorcing his wife, asked a court to declare that his marriage had 
produced no issue though his wife had given birth to a daughter conceived 
by artificial insemination with donor sperm.38  Despite insisting that a child 
so conceived was illegitimate, the court held the husband liable for the 
child’s support under an equitable-estoppel theory: the wife had “changed 
her position to her detriment” based on her husband’s “consent” to the 
insemination,39 creating an “implied contract to support.”40  Forty-eight 
                                                                                                                          
35 These states include Mississippi, Utah, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, and 
Wisconsin.  See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (2004) (stating “[a]doption by couples of the same 
gender is prohibited”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(3) (2012) (barring adoption by anyone 
“cohabitating in a relationship that is not legally valid” in Utah, such as a same-sex relationship); 
S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 836 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (barring adoption of child by a parent’s 
same-sex partner); In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 383 (Neb. 2002) (same); Boseman v. 
Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 505 (N.C. 2010) (same); In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (same); In re Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 680, 686 (Wis. 1994) 
(same). 
36 The first medically conducted artificial insemination in the United States apparently occurred in 
Philadelphia in 1884 when a Professor Pancoast inseminated the (unconscious and unwitting) wife of 
an infertile wealthy merchant with semen collected from a medical student.                                 
Artificial Insemination, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/371
34/artifical-insemination (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).  
37 Kara W. Swanson, The Birth of the Sperm Bank, 71 ANNALS OF IOWA 241, 241 (2012). 
38 Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 408 (Sup. Ct. 1963). 
39 Id. at 412. 
40 Id. 
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years before same-sex marriage would become legal in New York,41 a New 
York court had declared a non-biological, non-adoptive parent legally 
responsible for a child based solely on that parent’s express wish to take on 
that role. 
The Gursky court was clearly concerned about holding actors 
accountable for their promises to serve as parents.42  That concern 
reverberates through similar cases in the years that follow, as does the 
similar solution of implying parenthood where it may not be, under 
traditional definitions, obvious.  In 1968, the California Supreme Court 
sustained the criminal conviction for nonsupport of a man who had 
consented to the artificial insemination of his wife.43  Eleven years later, a 
California appellate court estopped a putative parent from denying he was 
a six-year-old boy’s father after he had “intended [the boy] to accept and 
act upon such representation.”44  The trend continues in 2013: upon a trial 
court’s finding that a divorcing father “knowingly and voluntarily 
consent[ed]” to artificial insemination, the Indiana Court of Appeals 
recently held the man liable to support the children of his marriage.45  This 
estoppel-type approach has even been applied to hold both spouses legally 
responsible after they employed a surrogate mother to bring forth a child 
genetically related to neither of them.46  The sole member of the triad not 
held legally responsible was the surrogate, the only person biologically 
related to the child.47 
It bears noting that mini-DOMA states are represented in the list of 
jurisdictions willing to assign parentage without a showing of biological or 
adoptive liability.  In 1987, South Carolina’s highest court confirmed that a 
husband’s “knowledge of and assistance in” his wife’s insemination made 
him the legal father of the offspring resulting.48  In Arkansas, given his 
consent to insemination and his wife’s detrimental reliance on it, a husband 
was estopped from denying the children of his marriage.49  A husband in 
                                                                                                                          
41 Same-sex marriage became legal in New York State in 2011.  See Marriage Equality Act, 2011 
N.Y. Sess. Laws 95 (A. 8354) (McKinney) (defining marriage as valid between parties of “the same or 
different sex”). 
42 242 N.Y.S.2d at 412. 
43 People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495, 497, 501–02 (Cal. 1968). 
44 In re Marriage of Johnson, 152 Cal. Rptr. 121, 123–24 (Ct. App. 1979). 
45 Engelking v. Engelking, 982 N.E.2d 326, 328–29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 
46 In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282, 294 (Ct. App. 1998). 
47 Id. at 288, 288 n.12. 
48 In re Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d 877, 879 (S.C. 1987).  South Carolina is a mini-DOMA state that 
prohibits same-sex marriage under its constitution and by statute.  See S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15 
(declaring that heterosexual marriage is “the only lawful domestic union” in South Carolina); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (1996) (declaring same-sex marriages “void ab initio”). 
49 Brown v. Brown, 125 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003).  Arkansas is a mini-DOMA state 
that prohibits same-sex marriage under its constitution and by statute.  See ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 1 
(“Marriage consists only of the union of one man and one woman.”); id. 83, § 2 (allowing recognition 
of out-of-state heterosexual common-law marriages but denying recognition to any other out-of-state 
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Kansas was estopped from evading parentage after giving artificial-
insemination consent to his wife’s physician,50 and an Oregon man failed 
to sway an appeals court that his consent to insemination should not be 
binding if it had not been reduced to writing.51 
Finally, estoppel doctrine has been employed in cases similar to those 
above but by the opposite parties: husbands who have held themselves out 
as fathers of children not their genetic offspring, who sought nonetheless to 
establish parental rights.  As early as 1948, a New York trial court refused 
a wife’s request to deny visitation for her separated husband to their child 
born of artificial insemination.52  The court reasoned that the husband’s 
consent to the procedure involved the same custody considerations as that 
of an adoptive parent.53  Twenty-five years later, a New York court again 
bolstered the rights of non-biological parents by declaring that the consent 
of an ex-husband who was genetically unrelated to his ex-wife’s daughter 
was nevertheless required prior to the adoption of that daughter by another 
man.54   
These cases show that in states both red and blue, in mini-DOMA and 
marriage-equality jurisdictions alike, courts have made establishing 
parentage a priority.  The dual judicial imperatives of providing the best 
possible care for the child and avoiding the appearance on state-support 
rolls of parentless waifs are simultaneously served each time a prospective 
parent is estopped from denying her or his non-biological child.  As these 
cases suggest, these dual imperatives have the power to trump traditional 
morality, religious instruction, individual liberty, and state statutory law to 
create non-traditional parents when and where such parents serve state 
interests.  This dynamic can also be reversed to empower parents to 
establish non-traditional custody over their purported children.  In each of 
                                                                                                                          
quasi-marital unions); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208 (1997) (statutorily banning same-sex marriage and 
preempting recognition of same-sex marriages from other states). 
50 R.S. v. R.S., 670 P.2d 923, 925, 928 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983).  Kansas is a mini-DOMA state that 
prohibits same-sex marriage under its constitution and by statute.  See KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16 
(declaring all marriages other than one man to one woman “contrary to the public policy” and “void”); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2501 (2007) (defining marriage as between parties “of opposite sex”); see also 
Id. § 23-2508 (declaring full faith and credit for all valid out-of-state marriages in its first sentence but 
then precluding recognition of any similarly valid same-sex union in its second). 
51 In re Marriage of A.C.H. & D.R.H., 210 P.3d 929, 933 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).  Oregon is a mini-
DOMA state that prohibits same-sex marriage under its constitution.  OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a (“It is 
the policy of Oregon, and its political subdivisions, that only a marriage between one man and one 
woman shall be valid or legally recognized as a marriage.”).  However, as of late 2013, Oregon does 
recognize same-sex marriages certified in other states, making its mini-DOMA perhaps the weakest in 
the nation.  See Scott Hewitt, Same-Sex Oregon Couples Flock to Clark County to Wed, COLUMBIAN, 
Nov. 24, 2013, http://www.columbian.com/news/2013/nov/24/gay-same-sex-marriage-Oregon-Clark-
County/ (documenting same-sex Oregon couples’ marrying out-of-state to secure in-state recognition). 
52 78 N.Y.S.2d 390, 390–91 (Sup. Ct. 1948). 
53 Id.  
54 In re Adoption of Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. 1973). 
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these cases, as in the cases of many same-sex partners seeking child 
custody in mini-DOMA states today, neither genetics nor adoption 
established parentage.  Still, courts inferred a parental relationship from 
circumstances—circumstances very similar to those in the dissolutions of 
same-sex unions occurring every day in post-DOMA/mini-DOMA 
America.  
IV.  THE PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT  
AND FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 
Article IV of the U.S. Constitution requires that each state afford 
meaning and enforcement—full faith and credit—to the judicial 
proceedings of every other state.55  Still, the U.S. Supreme Court has long 
held that only a “final judgment . . . qualifies for recognition throughout 
the land.”56  Yet the almost universal parlance for a motion addressing the 
custody of a child is a modification: it is axiomatic that as children grow 
and circumstances evolve, a change in custody conditions may be needed 
to protect the child’s best interests.  Since child-custody/visitation orders 
are, therefore, never final, they had escaped the full-faith-and-credit 
requirement until, in Thompson v. Thompson,57 the Supreme Court noted 
that by 1980, as many as 100,000 children may have been kidnapped by 
non-custodial parents and transported into friendlier jurisdictions.58  As 
Professor Roger Baron acknowledged, “The losing party in the custody 
litigation would much prefer to avoid having a modification hearing before 
the same court which has once already ruled in favor of the opposing 
side.”59    
Congress, which is empowered to dictate the terms of full faith and 
credit,60 responded with a federal act to curb the “national epidemic of 
parental kidnapping.”61  The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 
(“PKPA”), was enacted with a provision entitled “Full Faith and Credit 
Given to Child Custody Determinations.”62  The Act intones that only one 
                                                                                                                          
55 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
56 Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998). 
57 484 U.S. 174 (1988). 
58 Id. at 181. 
59 Roger M. Baron, Child Custody Jurisdiction, 38 S.D. L. REV. 479, 485 (1993). 
60 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
61 Thompson, 484 U.S. at 180–81. 
62 Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 8, 94 Stat. 3568, 3569 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2012)).  The 
PKPA had been preceded by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), a model state law 
recommended by, among others, the American Bar Association.  Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of 
Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1207 n.1 (1969).  The UCCJA’s slow, piecemeal adoption by state 
legislatures rendered it largely ineffective as a uniform standard.  The PKPA was intended to create the 
single American standard the UCCJA had failed to engender.  Linda M. DeMelis, Note, Interstate 
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state—the home state of an affected child—can rule on custody, disallows 
minimum-contacts attempts to get around this pronouncement, and 
requires that courts outside the child’s home state fully honor the custody 
decrees of the home state.63  While doubts exist about the precise 
effectiveness of the PKPA,64 its essential success in preempting state law 
to establish a single controlling forum for each custody case has been clear 
for decades.65 
Thanks to the success of the PKPA, one essential element of 
marriage—child custody—is afforded national, uniform enforcement that 
marriage rights themselves are not.  While regulatory issues such as the 
delineation of incest, the age of consent, and pre-remarriage waiting 
periods have kept marriage squarely within the public-policy exception to 
the full faith and credit clause,66 the PKPA wrenches child custody out of 
that exception and prevents a state from choosing to apply its own law over 
those of other states that have already made a valid custody adjudication.  
Most mini-DOMAs are, at heart, state choice-of-law provisions rejecting 
the marital experiments of other states.  A law such as the PKPA, which in 
one stroke denies state choice of law and touches directly on an issue as 
deeply embedded in marriage policy as child custody, is therefore capable 
of sending significant shudders through state same-sex parenting 
jurisprudence in mini-DOMA fiefs.   
The PKPA’s effects have been clearly demonstrated in Virginia, a 
mini-DOMA battleground.67  By a strong margin, Virginians voted to add 
an amendment banning same-sex marriage to their state constitution in 
2006.68  Given the judicial adoption of gay marriage in Massachusetts three 
                                                                                                                          
Child Custody and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act: The Continuing Search for a National 
Standard, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1329, 1330 (1994). 
63 See DeMelis, supra note 62, at 1336 (explicating the strictures of the PKPA). 
64 See id. at 1330 (suggesting the PKPA is a “[q]ualified [s]uccess” though states continue to 
“differ in their interpretations of [its] jurisdictional rules”). 
65 See, e.g., Roger M. Baron, Federal Preemption in the Resolution of Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Disputes, 45 ARK. L. REV. 885, 912 (1993) (claiming that the PKPA worked “wonderfully well” in 
establishing full faith and credit for custody decrees). 
66 See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public 
Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1969–70 (1997) (reviewing the exception as applied to marriage 
and states’ occasional refusals to recognize one another’s marriages).  
67 For examples beyond the Virginia cases discussed here where the PKPA was used in state 
choice-of-law situations, see Perez v. Tanner, 965 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Ark. 1998); Cann v. Howard, 850 
S.W.2d 57, 60 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993); Atkins v. Atkins, 623 So.2d 239, 243 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Potter v. 
Potter, 505 S.E.2d 147, 152 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); State ex rel Kasper v. Kasper, 792 P.2d 118, 130 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Larry R.W. v. Alan F.S. (In re Custody of Kit S.), 537 N.W.2d 30, 32–33 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1995).  
68 VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A; see also Chris L. Jenkins, Ban on Same-Sex Unions Added to Va. 
Constitution, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2006, at A46 (explaining that the Virginia constitutional ban 
“passed easily”). 
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years earlier,69 the ballot measure was largely supported as a means of 
insulating the state’s statutory mini-DOMA, which had existed since 1997 
and was augmented with a second statute in 2004, from judicial review.70  
Virginia’s resulting mini-DOMA was particularly strict: it not only banned 
same-sex marriages and civil unions and disallowed their recognition when 
created in other states, but it further specified that any contractual rights 
devolving from such unions would be void within Virginia’s borders.71  On 
the very day this enhanced 2004 mini-DOMA statute became law, a 
mother fleeing a same-sex relationship in Vermont filed a petition in a 
Virginia trial court to have her former partner stripped of any parental 
rights,72 pitting the new mini-DOMA against the PKPA. 
This story began in Falls Church, Virginia, where Lisa Miller and Janet 
Jenkins met and started a romantic relationship in 1997.73  Three years 
later, they entered a civil union in Vermont, melded their family names 
(hence, the Virginia case is Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins74), and decided 
to start a family via artificial insemination.75  With Jenkins’ participation 
and support, Miller gave birth to a daughter and the couple moved to 
Vermont full time so that they could raise the child in a state that endorsed 
their relationship.76  About one year later, when the couple separated, a 
Vermont court issued an initial order granting physical custody over the 
daughter to Miller and visitation to Jenkins.77  Less than one month later, 
Miller took the child back to Virginia and filed a request to render any 
custody claims by Jenkins “nugatory, void, illegal, and/or 
unenforceable,”78 echoing the language of the state’s just-enacted 2004 
                                                                                                                          
69 Goodridge v. Dept. Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); see also Tasha Robertson & 
Steve Friess, Gay Marriage Decision Spurs Action Across U.S., BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 28, 2003, at A1 
(noting that the “ripple effect” of the Massachusetts decision was “being felt from Arizona to 
Wisconsin, from New Jersey to Nevada”). 
70 See Chris L. Jenkins, As Campaign Days Dwindle, Marriage Issue Heats Up in Va.; N.J. 
Ruling Sparks Action on Amendment Question, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2006, at B01 (noting that 
“supporters say the amendment is necessary to protect against activist judges” such as those “in 
Massachusetts in 2003”); Jenkins, supra note 68 (suggesting that statutes prohibiting gay unions were 
seen by traditional-marriage supporters as insufficient to prevent judicial action allowing same-sex 
unions in Virginia); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (1997) (banning same-sex marriages and 
disallowing recognition of such marriages from other states); id. § 20-45.3 (2004) (banning all same 
sex-sex unions, partnerships, or similar arrangements and voiding all effects of such unions irrespective 
of their state of origin). 
71 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-45.2 to .3; Jenkins, supra note 68. 
72 Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 332 (Va. Ct. App. 2006). 
73 Erik Eckholm, Which Mother for Isabella? Civil Union Ends in an Abduction and Questions, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2012, at A1. 
74 Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d at 330. 
75 Eckholm, supra note 73. 
76 Id. 
77 Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d at 332. 
78 Id. 
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mini-DOMA.79  The Virginia trial court conceded, declaring Miller the 
girl’s “sole biological and natural parent.”80 
Still, the Vermont courts persisted in their claim of jurisdiction, 
invoking the PKPA and repining of Virginia’s statutory incapacity to 
decide issues arising out of a civil union.81  Defending her position before 
the Virginia Court of Appeals, Miller specifically made Section 2 of the 
federal Defense of Marriage Act—the states’-powers provision that 
remains in place today82—the centerpiece of her argument, claiming that 
DOMA “effectively trump[ed] the PKPA.”83  The court roundly rejected 
this argument, ruling that DOMA did not repeal the PKPA, did not conflict 
with the PKPA, and did nothing to disturb a custody order properly 
executed by an out-of-state court.84  As to Virginia’s 2004 mini-DOMA 
bar of rights derived from out-of-state same-sex relationships, the court 
curtly held that the mini-DOMA either did not apply or was “preempted by 
the PKPA.”85  Virtually from its beginning, then, one of the most drastic 
anti-same-sex-rights statutes in the country was unable to undermine an 
out-of-state custody decision based on a same-sex-union statute.  Janet 
Jenkins could not have married Lisa Miller in Virginia, but she was able to 
assert her parental rights over Miller’s biological offspring there with the 
full support of the local appellate courts. 
From the point of view of marriage-equality activists, a case like 
Miller-Jenkins is compelling for the headlines it can generate, but it is 
perhaps most important for its subtle precedential effects.  There is 
evidence of such effects in the 2009 Virginia Court of Appeals decision in 
Prashad v. Copeland.86  The case was a child-custody dispute between a 
gay couple, to whom a North Carolina court had granted primary 
custody,87 and the surrogate who had given birth to their child in 
Minnesota.88  The surrogate, who was in a heterosexual marriage, 
attempted to challenge the North Carolina order in Virginia, relying in part 
on identical arguments to those made by Lisa Miller: that DOMA “trumps 
the PKPA” and that Virginia’s 2004 mini-DOMA prevents recognition of 
                                                                                                                          
79 See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (“Any such civil union, partnership contract or other 
arrangement entered into by persons of the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall be void in all 
respects in Virginia and any contractual rights created thereby shall be void and unenforceable.”). 
80 Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d at 332. 
81 Id. at 333.  The parallel Vermont case is Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 
2006). 
82 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (stating full-faith-and-credit interstate treatment for 
same-sex marriages not required under the remaining federal DOMA provisions). 
83 Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d at 336. 
84 Id. at 337. 
85 Id.  
86 685 S.E.2d 199 (Va. Ct. App. 2009). 
87 Id. at 201–02. 
88 Id. at 201. 
 2014] CROSSPOLLINATION OF SAME-SEX CIVIL RIGHTS POST-DOMA 1665 
the couple’s custody decree.89  The court sidestepped the invitation 
altogether, holding that it in no way needed to recognize the marriage to 
recognize the child custody created in North Carolina.90   
In sum, in 2006, the Virginia Court of Appeals used the PKPA to 
uphold the visitation rights of a lesbian parent to her partner’s biological 
daughter.  In 2009, the same statute led the court to confirm that two gay 
men have superior custody rights to those of their child’s biological 
heterosexual mother.  Thus, cases like Prashad and Miller-Jenkins 
demonstrate the PKPA’s relevance as a tool in LGBT legal campaigns.    
Janet Jenkins’ legal victory was pyrrhic; her case ended in the 
abduction, transportation, and disappearance of her child.91  Such an 
ending casts light on the imperatives behind the PKPA, on society’s 
collective wish to see children safely and civilly settled.  Certainly, the 
decisions in Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins and Prashad v. Copeland 
need not be interpreted as anything more than what settled law 
demanded.92  Possibly, however, the Virginia Court of Appeals’ refusal, 
even in dicta, to take up the mantras of state sovereignty and traditional-
marriage defense, and its clear willingness to sidestep those issues and 
allow the PKPA to function unfettered, shows an ordering of priorities in 
which the concern for children apparently outweighs concerns over their 
parents’ lifestyles.  Whether strictly in a legal sense or perhaps within a 
deeper social context, the PKPA serves to empower the members of same-
sex relationships even where those relationships themselves have never 
been legally cognizable.  
V.  SAME-SEX PARENTAL RIGHTS IN THREE  
CONTRASTING MINI-DOMA STATES 
This Note now turns to examine whether same-sex partners’ parental 
rights have actually been bolstered by de facto parentage and PKPA 
                                                                                                                          
89 Id. at 202, 206–07. 
90 Id. at 207. 
91 Miller, who became a deeply religious conservative, repeatedly frustrated visitation, resulting in 
contempt convictions in the Vermont courts.  Eckholm, supra note 73.  In 2008, the United States 
Supreme Court denied certiorari in her fight against Vermont.  Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 555 
U.S. 888, 888 (2008).  In September 2009, she absconded with her daughter to a Mennonite settlement 
in Nicaragua.  Eckholm, supra note 73.  After the arrest of a pastor for his role in the kidnapping, 
Miller and the girl disappeared and are believed to be at large in Nicaragua still.  Id.  It may be 
tempting to say that this turn of events describes a need for greater equality in child-custody for same-
sex relationships, but as both pro- and anti-marriage-equality state courts and the U.S. Supreme Court 
concurred in the enforcement, the resolution may be more a reflection of the sad reality of equality 
achieved, with a same-sex partner losing touch with her child not because of legal barriers but because 
of the legal system’s incapacity to control events in the roiling seascape of intra-family law. 
92 See, e.g., Meade v. Meade, 812 F.2d 1473, 1474, 1478 (4th Cir. 1987) (affirming that the PKPA 
trumps state law and mandating Virginia’s continuing to control the case despite the mother’s securing 
custody modifications from a North Carolina court). 
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applications in state case law.  To answer that question from a broad 
perspective, three long-time mini-DOMA states that are geographically 
dispersed and culturally dissimilar are examined: Illinois, Montana, and 
Alabama.  The anti-gay-marriage policies of these states, and the ways in 
which those policies have or have not resulted in changes to gay-parenting 
rulings in the state courts, raise questions about the capacity of any state in 
2014 to embargo same-sex family rights completely. 
A.  Case Law and Statutory Developments in Illinois 
Both geographically and politically, Illinois sits amidst the nation.  Its 
demographics, political history, and civic culture defy simple red-blue 
classification.  Political statisticians divide the state into three regions: 
Chicago/Cook County, the state’s key population center and a Democratic 
stronghold; the “collar counties,” five suburban jurisdictions ringing 
Chicagoland; and “downstate,” an immense swath of territory comprising 
ninety-six counties, the southernmost of which are twice as close to 
Mississippi’s borders as they are to Chicago’s.93  The dynamic pitting 
liberal-leaning, populous upstate counties against conservative-minded 
rural counties downstate has led to a historically purple jurisdiction: in the 
twenty years from 1968 to 1988, Illinois voted for the Republican 
candidate in every presidential election; in the two decades from 1992 
onward, it has voted for the Democrat each time.94 
In accord with its conservative legacy, Illinois firmly rejected same-
sex marriage.  It passed three statutory mini-DOMA provisions in 1996, 
adding same-sex marriage to its enumerated list of prohibited marriages,95 
enacting a separate statute declaring same-sex marriage “contrary to the 
public policy of this State,”96 and adding, as contemplated in the second 
section of the federal DOMA,97 a component barring recognition in Illinois 
of same-sex marriages legally contracted in other states.98  Perhaps 
characteristically given its lack of political orthodoxy, Illinois never 
cemented its mini-DOMA regime in a constitutional amendment.  Still, the 
mini-DOMA was sufficiently strong to deny surviving-spouse inheritance 
                                                                                                                          
93 Micah Cohen, Political Geography: Illinois, N.Y. TIMES FIVETHIRTYEIGHT BLOG (Mar. 20, 
2012, 8:35 AM) http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/political-geography-
illinois/?_php=true&type=blogs&_r=1. 
94 Illinois Election Results, U.S. ELECTION ATLAS, http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/ 
state.php?fips=17&off=99 (last visited Mar. 13, 2014). 
95 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212(a)(5) (West 1996) (prohibiting “a marriage between 2 
individuals of the same sex”). 
96 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/213.1 (West 1996). 
97 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012) (denying full-faith-and-credit interstate treatment for same-sex 
marriages under federal DOMA).  
98 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/216 (West 1996) (“Prohibited marriages void if contracted in 
another state.”).  
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rights to a same-sex partner after an eight-year committed relationship— 
foreshadowing the issues in Windsor that would lead to DOMA’s demise 
in the summer of 2013.99 
The Illinois mini-DOMA also had a direct effect on child-custody 
issues.  For instance, in In re C.B.L.,100 a lesbian brought suit after being 
denied contact with her putative child since the end of an eleven-year 
relationship with the child’s biological mother.101  Although the petitioner 
had participated “dutifully” in the artificial insemination, birth, and rearing 
of the child, the court found the petitioner had no basis on which to ask for 
visitation as she fit none of the categories listed in the state’s marital 
statute.102  By the time she reached the appeals court, the petitioner had 
already given up any claim under the state’s marriage laws and was 
pursuing a de facto parent-theory103 of the sort that has worked in 
numerous cases to create parentage where biology and adoption were not 
available.104  The Illinois Appellate Court rejected implied parentage as a 
strategy for advancing LGBT parental rights and ultimately supported the 
Illinois mini-DOMA. 
Six years later, in In re Marriage of Simmons,105 the same appeals 
court denied any basis for a child-custody petition to a transgender man 
who, though born female, had lived as a male his entire adult life, taken 
testosterone for decades, undergone partial sex-reassignment surgery,  
obtained an Illinois birth-certificate modification listing him as “male,” and 
married a woman in a certified Cook County ceremony.106  After six years, 
the couple mutually decided to have a baby via artificial insemination, and 
the petitioner was duly listed as the child’s father on its birth certificate.107  
Despite the marriage, the clear implied-parentage arguments, and the 
evidence of the birth certificate, upon the couple’s dissolution the court 
held that the petitioner was not a parent of the child, as he, a legal 
female,108 had never actually been a husband.109  While the Illinois 
Parentage Act110 gives a consenting husband full paternal rights over a 
                                                                                                                          
99 In re Estate of Hall, 707 N.E.2d 201, 207–08 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); see also United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
100 723 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
101 Id. at 317. 
102 Id. at 317, 320–21. 
103 Id. at 318. 
104 See supra Part III (tracing the use of estoppel and implied parentage to establish parental 
rights). 
105 825 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
106 Id. at 306–07. 
107 Id. at 307. 
108 The Court referred to the petitioner throughout using male pronouns for, it said, “respect” and 
with “no legal significance.”  Id. at 306 n.1. 
109 Id. at 315. 
110 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/1–40/3 (West 1992). 
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child created by artificial insemination, the court held it could not be 
applied to the petitioner.111  
Both facts and timing suggest the Marriage of Simmons Court may 
have ruled with an eye to preserving the heterosexual clarity in the 
language of the Illinois mini-DOMA.  By the time the case was decided, 
the Illinois Supreme Court had already, in the 2003 case In re Parentage of 
M.J.,112 faced a similar scenario involving a heterosexual couple.  A man 
involved in a love affair with a woman gave his consent, encouragement, 
and support to her efforts to have a child by means of artificial 
insemination with donor sperm.113  When the procedure produced twins, 
the man initially supported the new family but, upon the couple’s breaking 
up, stopped doing so.114  The case involved the mother’s attempt to obtain 
child support—analogous to the Marriage of Simmons petitioner’s attempt 
to establish child visitation—based on the same Illinois Parentage Act.115  
The court held that because the mother had failed to get the father’s written 
consent to the artificial insemination, she could not mount a claim under 
the Act.116   
It would appear, then, that the traditional couple and non-traditional 
couple were dealt with identically in that neither could succeed under the 
Act.  But that reading overlooks two critical differences.  First, the 
transgender petitioner in Marriage of Simmons in fact had executed written 
consent at a fertility clinic in full accord with the Parentage Act’s 
strictures,117 yet still he was denied the parental status that would have 
been granted to the Parentage of M.J. petitioner had she possessed the 
same documentation.  Second, the Illinois Supreme Court did not 
ultimately rule against the Parentage of M.J. petitioner.  Despite finding 
that the Parentage Act did not advance the petitioner’s claim, the court held 
that she could still pursue her case for child-support payments “based on 
common law theories of oral contract or promissory estoppel.”118  The 
state’s high court took pains to show that the Parentage Act did not 
preclude implied-parent doctrine and that the legislature wanted the 
common law to continue establishing parentage whenever possible.119  Yet 
two years later, a lower court failed to offer this second-chance solution to 
                                                                                                                          
111 Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 315. 
112 787 N.E.2d 144 (Ill. 2003). 
113 Id. at 146. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 147. 
116 Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d at 150. 
117 In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 310 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
118 Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d at 150, 152. 
119 See id. at 151 (examining three sections of the Illinois Parentage Act and finding “nothing to 
prohibit common law actions to establish parental responsibility, and the state’s public policy 
considerations support a finding in favor of allowing common law actions”). 
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the transgender Marriage of Simmons petitioner, as he resided in what that 
court considered a same-sex relationship.120  Especially in contrast with 
Parentage of M.J., the 2005 Marriage of Simmons decision shows not only 
the legal but possibly the prejudicial effects of a mini-DOMA that elevates 
some relationships and denies status to others. 
Jurisprudence evolved.  Ten years earlier—one year prior to the mini-
DOMA’s enactment—the same court produced an opinion that was much 
friendlier to LGBT family rights in In re Petition of K.M.  That court had 
interpreted Illinois’ adoption statutes liberally to allow “unmarried persons 
. . . regardless of sex or sexual orientation, to petition for adoption 
jointly.”121  This decision allowed two different lesbian couples to begin 
families under Illinois law pending hearings on whether the adoptions 
would have been in the best interests of the children.122  As these second-
parent adoptions were sanctioned by the state, the same-sex partners were 
assured of custody rights (and faced with support obligations) even if their 
unrecognized unions broke up.  It is possible to read this decision, cast into 
case law on the eve of the mini-DOMA, as an undercurrent of openness to 
same-sex parenting in Illinois’ courts, an impulse that was then repressed 
in decisions like In re C.B.L. and In re Marriage of Simmons during the 
mini-DOMA era. 
If that interpretation is true, equality in parenting was an undercurrent 
that would resurface in time.  The facts of Connor v. Velinda C.123 show 
the willingness of an Illinois court to put a child’s best interests ahead of 
biology in making a custody determination.  When an unwed teen gave 
birth to a daughter, the teen’s mother, Velinda, and the mother’s female 
partner, Barbara, jointly adopted the baby,124 in the mode contemplated by 
the Petition of K.M. case above.  Though Velinda and Barbara’s apparent 
intention was to raise the baby at home with its biological mother and, in 
time, reverse the adoption to return custody to the natural parent, a custody 
struggle ensued when Velinda and Barbara separated.125  Relying on a case 
from the early 1990s, the court held that the custody-fitness factors in the 
marital Act applied to the women’s situation, even if they were not legally 
permitted to marry.126  Given the vexed and volatile nature of life in 
                                                                                                                          
120 See Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 313 (“In the instant case, equitable estoppel cannot 
apply because no action on the part of respondent can confer standing on petitioner to seek custody.”). 
121 In re Petition of K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
122 Id. at 890–91, 899. 
123 826 N.E.2d 1265 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).   
124 Id. at 1266–67. 
125 Velinda C., 826 N.E.2d at 1266–67. 
126 Id. at 1271 (citing Hall v. Hall, 589 N.E.2d 553, 555 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)).  While they 
cohabited and adopted a child together, the nature of the women’s relationship is not clear.  The baby’s 
natural grandmother/adoptive mother did invoke the Illinois mini-DOMA in attempting to persuade the 
court that the unfavorable marital law did not apply, ostensibly meaning to characterize her relationship 
with her partner as a would-be same-sex marriage.  Id.  Still, within two years of adopting the child, the 
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Velinda’s home,127 a trial court awarded, and the appeals court affirmed, 
custody over the daughter to Barbara.128  The court relied on a marriage-
dissolution statute to justify taking a child out of its biological mother’s 
home, away from its biological grandmother’s custody, and placing it in 
the permanent care of a same-sex partner who, under the mini-DOMA, 
could not have formed a marriage to dissolve.   
Strikingly, the Marriage of Simmons and Connor v. Velinda C. cases 
both occurred in 2005 and both in the Illinois Appellate Court.  Equally 
strikingly, where the Marriage of Simmons Court declined to find any basis 
on which the transgender parent could assert a custody claim over a child 
he helped create and rear, the Velinda C. Court, without fraught, allowed a 
biologically and matrimonially unrelated life partner to take custody.  The 
dissonance in the decisions is most easily resolved by noting that the non-
biological partner in Velinda C. was a legal adoptive parent.129  As is 
hinted at in the Virginia case law, however, the different outcomes may 
also be the result of the court’s reasoning that the best interests of the child 
trumped the state’s condemnation of same-sex marriage.130  It is possible 
that since the court in Marriage of Simmons was satisfied that the offspring 
was safe in its biological mother’s care, it demurred to the mini-DOMA 
and refused to consider an equitable implication of parentage.131  Faced, 
however, with the prospect of a child growing up in a home beset by risk 
and instability, the Velinda C. Court chose to overlook any mini-DOMA 
complications and rest custody in the non-biological partner.132  In 2005, it 
                                                                                                                          
partner had married a man.  Id. at 1269.  The Court does not address the question of whether the 
women had, claimed to have had, or could have had a same-sex union of any kind.        
127 This volatility included financial difficulty, suicide attempts, self-harming behaviors, 
prescription-drug abuse, and the lingering effects of sexual abuse on members of the household.  Id. at 
1267. 
128 Id. at 1273. 
129 Id. at 1266. 
130 See supra Part IV (concluding by positing that the Virginia Court of Appeals may have put 
concern for children’s welfare ahead of the state’s position against same-sex marriage).  
131 See supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text (noting that the court refused to countenance 
equitable estoppel for a plaintiff from a same-sex relationship). 
132 This hypothesis can also explain the dissonant decisions in Marriage of Simmons and 
Parentage of M.J.  The latter case dealt with an already married man who, for ten years, assumed a 
false identity and started a second family with the unsuspecting petitioner.  In re Parentage of M.J., 787 
N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ill. 2003).  Upon being exposed, he attempted to escape all liability for that second 
family.  Id.  Faced with a scoundrel who proposed to leave his children bereft, the Court quickly saw its 
way to the secondary solution of parentage by estoppel.  Id. at 152.  Facing no such compulsion in 
Marriage of Simmons, the Court perhaps felt liberated to enforce the mini-DOMA as strictly as 
possible.  See supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text.  The Court in Marriage of Simmons largely 
endorses this hypothesis, stating that estoppel of the Parentage of M.J. variety may be applied to 
petitions for child-support payments but not to establish parental custody or visitation rights.  In re 
Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 312 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).  If the biological mother in Marriage 
of Simmons had been destitute and needed the transgendered father’s assistance to keep the children off 
state support, or if the father had been attempting to evade child-support duties instead of establishing 
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is tempting to say that Illinois disallowed same-sex marriages but 
condoned same-sex-parentage when it protected the state’s interest in child 
welfare. 
By the end of 2013, Illinois’ same-sex-parenting dynamic would be 
revolutionized both jurisprudentially and in public law.  In 2012, with the 
case of In re T.P.S.,133 the Illinois Appellate Court would again address the 
issues raised by Marriage of Simmons, with contrasting results.  In a 
pattern familiar in this Note, two lesbian partners in a long-term 
relationship agreed to pursue a pregnancy by artificial insemination 
resulting in two children whom the couple raised coequally but without 
establishing legal adoption.134  The partners broke up, the biological 
mother denied all contact with the girls to her former partner, and that 
partner filed an action to obtain parental rights.135  In a decision that 
mirrors the Marriage of Simmons resolution, the trial court dismissed the 
partner’s petition with prejudice, leaving the biological mother as the only 
legal parent of the girls.136 
The appeals court, however, reversed.  Upending a crucial rule posited 
in Marriage of Simmons, the court held that “common law contract and 
promissory estoppel causes of action for custody and visitation” could be 
asserted by a petitioning “nonbiological parent.”137  This is precisely the 
rule that had been requested by the Marriage of Simmons father without 
success,138 a rule that denudes the mini-DOMA of authority in child-
custody situations.  Without benefit of biology, adoption, or marriage, a 
purported parent in Illinois can nonetheless establish the right of custody or 
visitation over his or her child, just as the state can establish her or his duty 
of support, with parentage implied by estoppel.  At the end of 2012, Illinois 
was still a mini-DOMA jurisdiction, but its courts had granted same-sex 
partners the same rights in relation to their children that the state’s married 
citizens enjoyed. 
In 2013, the Illinois legislature took the ultimate step and abandoned 
the mini-DOMA altogether.139  By votes of thirty-two to twenty-one in the 
state Senate and sixty-one to fifty-four in the state House, Illinois became 
                                                                                                                          
visitation, would the court have been more solicitous toward him and raised the estoppel doctrines in 
that case? 
133 978 N.E.2d 1070 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). 
134 Id. at 1071–72. 
135 Id. at 1072. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 1075. 
138 See Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 313 (“In the instant case, equitable estoppel cannot 
apply because no action on the part of respondent can confer standing on petitioner to seek custody.”). 
139 Monique Garcia et al., Lawmakers Affirm Gays’ Right to Wed: Illinois Is Set to Join 14 Other 
States, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 6, 2013, at C1. 
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the fifteenth state to usher in same-sex marriage.140  In Illinois, at least, the 
evolving position of the judiciary on LGBT child-custody rights appears to 
have matched an evolution in public (and hence legislative) support, 
making the state a potential model for marriage-equality activists.  The 
Petition of K.M. case pointed to a preexisting judicial openness to same-
sex family rights that—though stymied for some seventeen years—was 
capable of revivification as the public’s mood and demographic make-up 
changed.  The Illinois case study calls for locating the preexisting 
sympathies of lawmakers, enduring the setbacks of early cases, and over 
time making a subtle but persuasive showing of the need for and benefits 
accruing to society from same-sex parents in state-sanctioned marriages.   
That case study, however, should be embraced with caution: Illinois 
may not be a model for the nation.  As Illinois’ mini-DOMA was never 
enshrined in its state constitution, repeal was procedurally much less 
complicated than it will or would be in the majority of states banning 
same-sex marriage.  Further, despite Illinois’ potential conservative 
leanings, the state sits neither in the Mountain West nor the Deep South.  
The undercurrent of sympathy supporting same-sex parenting in Illinois 
may never have been manifest at all in more conservative states, making 
the challenge one of creation rather than resuscitation.  This Note now 
moves west and south to examine such creation’s chances.  
B.  Case Law Developments in Montana 
If Illinois is tightly woven into the center of American society, 
Montana is, according to one historian, defined by “isolation, rugged land, 
severe weather, and small population.”141  Even the state’s name, derived 
from a Latinate adjective meaning “mountainous,”142 seems to tout 
harshness, remoteness, and solitude.  Given its geographic aloofness and 
historically extraction-based economy,143 one might assume Montana 
would be among the reddest of states, and, indeed, all but twice since 1952 
Montana has given its Electoral College votes to the Republican ticket.144  
Yet a palpable legacy of frontier independence may be detected in its 
politics: while its state legislature boasts strong G.O.P. majorities in both 
                                                                                                                          
140 Dave McKinney, Gay Marriage Bill Passes State House, Senate—Heads to Quinn’s Desk, 
CHI. SUN-TIMES (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.suntimes.com/23558841-418/gay-marriage-bill-passes-in-
illinois-house.html. 
141 Mary Melcher, “Women’s Matters”: Birth Control, Prenatal Care, and Childbirth in Rural 
Montana, 1910–1940, in MONTANA LEGACY: ESSAYS ON HISTORY, PEOPLE, AND PLACE 132, 148 
(Harry W. Fritz et al. eds., 2002). 
142 MICHAEL P. MALONE ET AL., MONTANA: A HISTORY OF TWO CENTURIES 95 (rev. ed. 1991). 
143 Pat Williams, Foreword to GREG LEMON, BLUE MAN IN A RED STATE: MONTANA’S 
GOVERNOR BRIAN SCHWEITZER AND THE NEW WESTERN POPULISM, at vii (2008). 
144 Montana Election Results, U.S. ELECTION ATLAS, http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/state.p
hp?year=0&off=99&elect=0&fips=30&f=0 (last visited Apr. 15, 2014). 
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chambers,145 its two U.S. senators are Democrats,146 as is its governor.147  
John Patrick Williams, an eighteen-year Montana Congressman, described 
the region’s politics toward the end of the twentieth century by saying, 
“For one hundred years the West’s political pendulum had swung 
consistently between Democrats and Republicans.”148 
There is evidence of such independent thinking in Montanans’ history 
of shirking tradition and custom to forge their own solutions to social and 
family challenges.  It was “common among rural and working-class 
women in Montana well into the twentieth century” to give birth at home 
assisted only by “neighbors, midwives, and husbands.”149  With the dearth 
of “ministers, priests, and rabbis” in Montana for much of its history, the 
territorial government authorized a range of public officials to conduct 
wedding ceremonies, and the law liberally sanctioned common-law 
marriages so long as they had been recognized by the public.150   
Even so, liberality has its boundaries.  The “West” depicted by 
Congressman Williams is the American “Mountain West,” an eight-state 
region151 where seven states (including Montana) have mini-DOMAs, five 
(including Montana) have both statutory and constitutional mini-DOMAs, 
and only one has legalized same-sex marriage.152  Despite its legacy of 
tolerating self-help solutions where marriage and children are concerned,153 
Montana has also manifested an abiding desire to bring matrimony into 
conformity with societal mores.  Both in the late nineteenth century and 
again in the Great Depression, campaigns sprang up to ban common-law 
marriage in Montana.154  While these campaigns failed to change the law, 
Martha Kohl notes their cultural success: “regardless of the legality of 
                                                                                                                          
145 63rd Legislature Demographics, 2013–2014, MONT. LEGISLATURE, 
http://leg.mt.gov/css/About-the-Legislature/Facts-and-Statistics/2013-demographics.asp (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2014). 
146 Congressional Delegation, MONTANA.GOV, http://mt.gov/govt/congressional_delegation.mcpx 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014). 
147 Matt Volz, Bullock Defeats Hill in Montana Governor Race, BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 8, 2012, 
at B1. 
148 Williams, supra note 143, at viii; Pat Williams: Senior Advisor, WILLIAMSWORKS, 
http://williamsworks.com/team/pat-williams/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2014). 
149 Melcher, supra note 141, at 134. 
150 MARTHA KOHL, I DO: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF MONTANA WEDDINGS 12 (2011).  
151 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS BUREAU REGIONS AND DIVISIONS WITH STATE FIPS 
CODES (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/maps/pdfs/reference/us_regdiv.pdf 
(identifying Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming as the 
Mountain West region). 
152 Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Utah ban gay marriage both by statute and 
constitutional amendment.  Gay Marriage, supra note 9.  Nevada only has a constitutional ban while 
Wyoming only maintains a statutory ban.  Id.  Colorado and Nevada do allow non-marital same-sex 
domestic unions.  Ahuja & Chow, supra note 12.  New Mexico sanctioned same-sex marriage at the 
end of 2013.  Carcamo, supra note 11. 
153 See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text. 
154 KOHL, supra note 150, at 7. 
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common-law marriages, couples wanted official sanction.”155  The 
Montana legislature has instituted various waiting periods prior to marriage 
licensure in a fruitless effort to reduce cohabitation and divorce,156 and 
Montana’s highest court defended the institution by naming married—or 
even merely engaged—persons a “protected class” for civil-rights 
purposes.157  Most relevant to this Note, Montana has prohibited same-sex 
marriage statutorily158 and in 2004 via constitutional amendment.159 
Still, it is the thesis of this Note that even where the most fundamental 
laws clearly disallow same-sex marriage, same-sex partners can sometimes 
establish equal civil rights to their heterosexual counterparts.  For example, 
in Snetsinger v. Montana University System,160 two lesbian couples, each 
with a partner employed by the defendant, challenged the Montana 
University System’s policy of subsidizing spousal benefits to marital and 
heterosexual common-law spouses of employees, but not to same-sex 
partners.161  The court held that a “policy of denying health benefits to 
unmarried same-sex couples while granting the benefits to unmarried 
opposite-sex couples results in a denial of equal protection.”162  While the 
court stressed “what this case is not about”—Montana’s marriage laws—
and insisted that granting a same-sex couple equal standing to a legally 
recognized common-law couple did not equate to a right to common-law 
marriage for same-sex partners, it is hard to see how the holding does not 
create a quasi-marital status.163  In a state statutorily set against gay 
marriage and in a year when its voters would cast that opposition into 
constitutional authority, same-sex partners won in court a significant social 
benefit previously thought reserved to heterosexual couples. 
Similar victories have occurred for LGBT legal activists where 
Montanan child-custody issues are concerned, in decisions perhaps more 
plausible from a Massachusetts or California court than one in a mini-
DOMA jurisdiction.  In the case of In re L.F.A.,164 a biological mother 
                                                                                                                          
155 Id. at 12. 
156 Id. at 7. 
157 Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc. v. Foss, 38 P.3d 836, 839–40 (Mont. 2001). 
158 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401(d) (prohibiting “a marriage between persons of the same 
sex”). 
159 See Timothy Egan, Montana Democrats Reflect on Success, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, at 1–
28 (listing the gay-marriage referendum as an exception to Democrats’ remarkable success in 2004 
state races); MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7 (“Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be 
valid or recognized as a marriage in this state.”). 
160 104 P.3d 445 (Mont. 2004). 
161 Id. at 448. 
162 Id. at 452. 
163 Id. at 449.  The court’s denials that it had consecrated common-law gay marriage were so 
unconvincing to one dissenting justice that he claimed they reached “the dewpoint of duplicity.”  Id. at 
475 (Rice, J., dissenting).  
164 220 P.3d. 391 (Mont. 2009).   
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argued that only biology or adoption could establish parentage under 
Montana law, meaning her erstwhile same-sex partner had no claim to 
visitation with the three children they had raised together.165  The Montana 
Supreme Court, however, endorsed a trial court finding that the non-
biological mother had sufficiently acted as a parent to the children to 
obtain in loco parentis status,166 largely echoing the estoppel-parentage 
doctrines discussed in Part III of this Note.  On finding that keeping the 
non-biological, non-adoptive parent as a part of the children’s lives was in 
their best interest, the court approved a parenting arrangement that 
alternated custody between the two mothers.167  This split-custody 
arrangement shows that courts may not read the mini-DOMA as an 
overriding social condemnation of same-sex relationships in the way that 
Virginia’s ternary mini-DOMA apparently intended.168  Rather, just as the 
court treated same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples equally in 
Snetsinger,169 the court here treated a non-biological homosexual parent the 
same as a biological or heterosexual one, allowing her an equal chance to 
prove her implied parentage. 
Lest this case be read as an anomaly, the contemporaneous controversy 
in Kulstad v. Maniaci170 confirms, and perhaps extends, the court’s 
approach.  Kulstad is the case of two women who cohabited, exchanged 
rings, and represented themselves as partners, despite the absence of a 
same-sex legal institution under state law.171  Over time, the partners 
adopted two children, portraying themselves as co-parents during a “home 
study” with social workers prior to each adoption.172  Although only one of 
the women became the legal adoptive mother, both women played full and 
active roles in raising the children, functioning, in the court’s words, 
“much like any other two-parent family.”173  Upon the dissolution of their 
union, the adoptive mother fought—as the biological mother had in In re 
L.F.A.—to have her former partner denied custody of the adopted 
children.174 
The court took note of the trial court’s conclusion that while the 
adoptive mother was indeed the sole legal parent theretofore, the non-
adoptive mother had played a full parental role, the continuation of which 
                                                                                                                          
165 Id. at 392–93.   
166 Id. at 395. 
167 Id. at 394–95. 
168 See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text (explaining that Virginia enacted two statutes 
and a constitutional ban to insulate itself from the effects of same-sex marriage). 
169 See supra notes 160–63 and accompanying text (reviewing Montana high court’s holding that 
same-sex couples had same rights to benefits as heterosexual couples). 
170 220 P.3d 595 (Mont. 2009). 
171 Id. at 597. 
172 Id. at 597–98. 
173 Id. at 598. 
174 Kulstad, 220 P.3d at 599. 
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was in the children’s best interest.175  The court’s affirmation of a trial-
court order of joint custody ratified the In re L.F.A. holding and clarified 
that it extends to the realm of adopted children.176  Whether over the 
biological or adoptive children of their same-sex partners, when putative 
LGBT parents establish implied parentage they can, in Montana, assert 
custody claims with the same force as heterosexual parents.177  The 
ultimate resolution of the case makes the doctrine only clearer: when the 
adoptive mother left Montana for an extended period and failed to 
participate in the parenting plan, the trial court modified its order to grant 
sole custody to the non-adoptive mother.178  Upon the adoptive mother’s 
return, the case again reached the Montana Supreme Court, again resulting 
in an affirmation.179  A lesbian partner who, under the mini-DOMA, had no 
apparent parental rights nonetheless left a Montana court as the sole 
custodial parent. 
In the Snetsinger case, the Montana courts gave same-sex partners the 
same access to their partners’ health benefits that opposite-sex partners 
enjoyed.180  In In re L.F.A. and the two holdings of the Kulstad case, those 
courts gave same-sex partners the same consideration over their partners’ 
children that opposite-sex implied parents would enjoy.181  As they allow 
same-sex partners certain rights and benefits of marriage, these decisions 
may seem not at all in keeping with the two mini-DOMA provisions 
governing Montana family law.182  Yet as this Section has revealed, 
Montana has a history of publicly encouraging traditional, formal marriage 
while placidly tolerating the common-law cohabitation of consenting 
adults.183  Allowing couples, like those in Snetsinger, to obtain the spousal 
benefits they need to order their lives is out of sync with Montana’s mini-
DOMA prohibitions, but it is not out of line with Montana’s history of 
allowing isolated populations to determine their own modes of marriage 
and family life.  Granting parental rights to same-sex couples also seems to 
fit naturally into this narrative of independent life-ordering.  Whether 
Montanans’ endorsement of family independence will one day include a 
right to full same-sex marriages remains unknown but now seems entirely 
feasible.   
                                                                                                                          
175 Id. at 609. 
176 Id. at 609–10. 
177 Further, the non-adoptive mother was also awarded more than $100,000 from her former 
partner on equitable grounds, enhancing the degree to which the Court treated her as a common-law 
spouse.  Id. at 610. 
178 Kulstad v. Maniaci, 244 P.3d 722, 725–26 (Mont. 2010). 
179 Id. at 732. 
180 See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
181 See supra notes 167–68, 176, 178 and accompanying text. 
182 See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text. 
183 See supra notes 150, 156, 157 and accompanying text. 
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C.  Case Law Developments in Alabama 
Their same-sex marriage legislation notwithstanding, Illinois and 
Montana have never provided the most severe challenges for marriage-
equality seekers.  Few jurisdictions have been as hostile to same-sex 
marriage as Alabama, a state that has produced only one openly gay 
lawmaker in its one-hundred-ninety-four-year history.184  Alabama is one 
of twenty-six states to have banned same-sex marriage both by 
legislation185 and constitutional amendment.186  The Alabama Marriage 
Protection Act187 passed the state’s house chamber by a seventy-nine to 
twelve vote and the state senate by thirty to zero.188  A referendum adding 
a gay-marriage ban to the state constitution was voted in by the public—
with eighty-one percent support—in June 2006.189   
Both the statute and the amendment function as mini-DOMAs.  The 
former states that Alabama “shall not recognize as valid any marriage of 
parties of the same sex that occurred or was alleged to have occurred as a 
result of the law of any jurisdiction regardless of whether a marriage 
license was issued,”190 insulating Alabama’s government and courts from 
the actions of marriage-equality states like Massachusetts and New York.  
Identical language appears in the constitutional amendment, further 
precluding full-faith-and-credit treatment.191   
Alabama’s governors, lawmakers, and populace seem to have agreed 
that same-sex marriage and its attendant rights shall have no viability in 
their state, and this agreement is as strong and clear in Alabama as in any 
other state in the union.192  Such deep and abiding policy statements could 
be expected to translate into a judicial stance against parents in same-sex 
unions, and indeed an exploration of Alabama’s child-custody case law 
accordingly reads as a series of setbacks and disappointments for marriage 
equality.  Yet, even as far south as Montgomery, there are emerging signs 
                                                                                                                          
184 See Jake Grovum, Woman Trying to Change Alabama Gay Marriage Ban, CHARLESTON 
GAZETTE, July 6, 2013, at P1C (reporting on openly gay state legislator Patricia Todd’s plans to marry 
her partner in Massachusetts and challenge the Alabama ban in state court).  
185 ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (LexisNexis 2011). 
186 ALA. CONST. amend. 774. 
187 Act 1998-500 (codified at ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (LexisNexis 2011)). 
188 Same-Sex Marriages Banned in Alabama, TUSCALOOSA NEWS, Apr. 28, 1998, at 7A.  
189 Alabama Voters Send Mixed Message on Religion, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 8, 2006, at 32.   
190 ALA. CODE § 30-1-19(e). 
191 See ALA. CONST. amend. 774(e) (stating Alabama “shall not recognize as valid any marriage 
of parties of the same sex that occurred or was alleged to have occurred”). 
192 According to a 2013 report, Alabama ranks among the bottom three states in terms of public 
support for gay marriage—alongside Arkansas and Louisiana.  ANDREW R. FLORES & SCOTT 
BARCLAY, UCLA WILLIAMS INST., PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MARRIAGE FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES BY 
STATE 4 (2013), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Flores-Barclay-
Public-Support-Marriage-By-State-Apr-2013.pdf.  All three states ban same-sex marriage by both 
statute and constitutional amendment.  Gay Marriage, supra note 9. 
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of a doctrinal and practical evolution in Alabama’s position on same-sex 
parental rights.193  
In the recent past, Alabama’s courts have been notably hostile to same-
sex partners’ purported parenting rights.  Almost contemporaneously with 
the advent of Alabama’s mini-DOMA, the Alabama Supreme Court held in 
Ex parte J.M.F.194 that a custodial parent’s openly gay lifestyle was 
potentially detrimental to a child’s development and provided a legitimate 
basis for a court to upend a custody order.195  In the underlying case, J.B.F 
v. J.M.F.,196 a mother who had been awarded custody of her daughter upon 
the dissolution of a marriage soon began cohabiting with a lesbian 
partner.197  The mother and her partner formed a committed relationship 
and exchanged rings, and the partner actively participated in the child’s life 
by attending school functions and field trips.198  At the end of 1994, 
however, the girl’s father filed a motion to modify custody on the grounds 
that his ex-wife was “openly and notoriously” carrying on a lesbian 
relationship.199  
The trial court received a report from its appointed psychologist stating 
that the daughter was “developing normally,” that she “desired to live with 
the mother,” and that “fears about children . . . isolated in single-sex 
lesbian or gay communities are unfounded.”200  It adduced testimony from 
the child that she loved her mother, her mother’s partner, her father, and 
her stepmother all in kind.201  Yet the trial court granted the modification, 
transferring the girl to her father’s custody and issuing a visitation 
restriction that prevented the mother’s partner from being present during 
visits.202  Reviewing the case in 1997, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals 
characterized the child as a “bright, happy, well-adjusted seven-year-old 
girl” who “enjoys living with her mother and her mother’s companion.”203  
The court noted that the father considered his ex-wife “a good mother” 
who had “done a good job of raising the child.”204  The court held that the 
father bore the burden of demonstrating that the mother’s relationship 
affected the child detrimentally; absent that, the mere fact of an open 
homosexual relationship was not in itself grounds for a custody 
                                                                                                                          
193 See infra notes 237–53 and accompanying text. 
194 730 So. 2d 1190 (Ala. 1998). 
195 Id. at 1195–96. 
196 730 So. 2d 1186 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997), rev’d sub nom. Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190. 
197 Id. at 1187. 
198 Id. at 1188. 
199 Id. at 1187. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 1188. 
202 Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1194 (Ala. 1998). 
203 J.B.F v. J.M.F., 730 So. 2d at 1188. 
204 Id. 
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modification.205  It reversed the trial court’s order, leaving the girl in the 
same-sex household.206   
In June 1998, roughly six weeks after Alabama’s statutory mini-
DOMA became law, the state supreme court overruled the appellate 
decision, reinstating the trial court’s modification and holding:   
[T]he inestimable developmental benefit of . . . a successful 
marriage is undisputed.  The [remarried] father’s 
circumstances have changed, and he is now able to provide 
this benefit . . . . The mother’s circumstances have also 
changed, in that she is unable, while choosing to conduct an 
open cohabitation with her lesbian life partner, to provide this 
benefit.207 
The dissonance between the appellate and highest courts here is 
telling.208  The appellate court had held that a custody modification “solely 
because of a lesbian relationship” was “plainly and palpably wrong,” 
apparently concluding that same-sex couples were equally fit to raise 
children and requiring a showing of harm to mount a custody challenge.209  
This holding was not out of line with the state’s mini-DOMA, which did 
not, on its face, address child-custody issues or make it illegal for 
homosexual citizens to produce and rear children.210  Still, ruling in the era 
following that law, the state supreme court reversed to say that 
heterosexual couples are—as the only couples capable of marrying—de 
facto better parents than those of in same-sex relationships.211  As few 
same-sex appellants could point to a clearer example of a “happy, well-
adjusted” child than that of the J.M.F. mother,212 the case suggests that, all 
else being equal, any traditionally remarried parent will be able to secure 
primary custody of his or her children against a same-sex-cohabiting ex, 
even to the point of excluding the ex’s new partner from visitation.  At the 
conclusion of the J.M.F. cases, Alabama’s mini-DOMA regime and its 
                                                                                                                          
205 Id. at 1189.   
206 Id. at 1190. 
207 Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d at 1196. 
208 It is compelling to ponder whether the Court of Civil Appeals would have reached the same 
result had it decided the case after the advent of the mini-DOMA statute. 
209 J.B.F v. J.M.F., 730 So. 2d at 1190. 
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was struck down by the United States Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).  
The plaintiff-mother in J.B.F. v. J.M.F. had, for example, been careful to tell the courts that she and her 
partner kissed, hugged, and held hands but nothing more, 730 So. 2d at 1188, a dodge the Civil Court 
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211 See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
212 See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
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child-custody case law appeared to be marching in lockstep.  
The J.M.F. case did not address whether adoption might allow same-
sex partners to establish court-recognized parentage.  However, a much 
more recent Court of Civil Appeals case focusing on adoption turned on 
the Alabama mini-DOMA as a bulwark against full faith and credit.  In re 
Adoption of K.R.S.213 followed the 2008 same-sex marriage, in California, 
of an Alabama mother and a woman called C.D.S. who sought to adopt the 
mother’s child, K.R.S.,214 pursuant to Alabama’s step-parent adoption 
law.215  The court, after a straightforward recitation of the state’s statutory 
and constitutional mini-DOMA components,216 concluded that C.D.S. and 
the child’s mother were not married in Alabama, that C.D.S. was therefore 
not a step-parent, and that the legislature and voting public had already 
disposed of C.D.S.’s policy arguments in creating the mini-DOMA.217  The 
court held that C.D.S. had no right to adopt the child, ensuring the state 
remained entitled to deny same-sex partners parenting rights based on 
extra-territorial marital proceedings under the existing mini-DOMA.218 
In ruling against C.D.S., the court did offer the small hope that her 
challenge was not formulated to reach constitutional issues, possibly 
implying such a challenge could be mounted.219  But even so, the case 
makes a robust statement that gay-marriage developments in other states 
shall have no power to affect parenting rights in Alabama.  The fact that 
the case occurred fifteen years after J.B.F. v. J.M.F., and that the Court of 
Civil Appeals decided it after being supportive of same-sex-parenting 
capacity in that earlier case,220 may make the mini-DOMA-backed 
pronouncements of this court all the sharper. 
Alabama’s mini-DOMA is intended to prevent the advent of legal gay 
marriage in states like California from foisting gay-marriage rights upon 
citizens appearing in Alabama’s courts.221  The case of A.K. v. N.B.,222 
which tested the doctrinal intimations laid out by the Alabama courts in 
J.B.F. and K.R.S., followed (both in time and doctrine) on the heels of a 
well-known California child-custody case, Elisa B. v. Superior Court.223  In 
                                                                                                                          
213 109 So. 3d 176 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012). 
214 Id. at 177. 
215 ALA. CODE § 26-10A-27 (LexisNexis 2011) (stating that “[a]ny person may adopt his or her 
spouse’s child” providing three exceptions do not apply, none of which touches on same-sex 
relationships). 
216 In re K.R.S., 109 So. 3d at 177. 
217 Id. at 178.  The court did not enumerate those policy positions. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text. 
221 See ALA. CODE § 30-1-19(e) (LexisNexis 2011) (barring recognition in Alabama of “any 
marriage of parties of the same sex that occurred . . . as a result of the law of any jurisdiction”). 
222 66 So. 3d 242 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008), vacated, Ex parte N.B., 66 So. 3d 249 (Ala. 2010). 
223 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005). 
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Elisa B., the California Supreme Court declared that it could “perceive no 
reason why both parents of a child cannot be women.”224  The women were 
Elisa and Emily, who lived together as a committed couple between 1993 
and 1999.  They decided as partners each to get pregnant with the same 
donor sperm and then supported each other throughout concurrent 
pregnancies.  After both had given birth (Emily to twins), they chose their 
offspring’s names together, gave them a hyphenated family name, and 
mutually breastfed them without regard to the biological relationships.225 
When the couple broke up, Elisa—who had been the designated 
breadwinner—eventually ceased supporting Emily and Emily’s two 
biological children, claiming she had no paternal relationship to them.226  
Recognizing that Elisa had participated in producing the children and had 
made promises to care for them, a trial court ordered Elisa to pay child 
support on an equitable-estoppel theory.227  The Court of Appeal held Elisa 
was not a parent of Emily’s twins and reversed the order.228  The California 
Supreme Court, relying on California’s Uniform Parentage Act229 but 
applying it without regard to gender, held that as Elisa had “received the 
twins into her home and openly held them out as her natural children” she 
met the definition of a de facto parent under California law and had an 
ongoing responsibility to support Emily’s offspring.230 
A.K. v. N.B., the aforementioned Alabama case, differed from Elisa B. 
in that its plaintiff sought to establish, rather than escape, her responsibility 
for and rights over a child.  Still, in other respects it was nearly identical.  
A.K. and N.B. were a committed lesbian couple in California.231  In 1998, 
N.B. donated an egg for artificial insemination and carried the child to 
term;232 although only N.B.’s name appeared on the child’s birth 
certificate, A.K.’s family name was recorded in the hyphenated last name 
given to the baby.233  N.B. and A.K. separated in 2004, and by August 
2005, N.B. had followed her parents to Alabama, where she established a 
new home and eventually married a man.234  In September 2005, A.K. filed 
a petition for parental recognition with the California courts to establish 
                                                                                                                          
224 Id. at 666. 
225 Id. at 663. 
226 Id. at 663–64; Elisa Maria B. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 494, 497 (Ct. App. 2004), 
rev’d sub nom Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005). 
227 Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 663–69.  
228 Id.; Elisa Maria B., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 507. 
229 CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 76007670 (West 1994). 
230 Elisa B., 117 P.3d at  67273 (Kennard, J., concurring) (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d)). 
231 A.K. v. N.B., 66 So. 3d 242, 243 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008), vacated, Ex parte N.B., 66 So. 3d 249 
(Ala. 2010). 
232 See id. (neglecting to explain the couple’s decision-making but apparently characterizing them 
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233 Ex parte N.B., 66 So. 3d at 250. 
234 Id. at 250–51. 
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her right to visitation with the child, which eventually led to California 
awarding her visitation and ordering that her name be added to the child’s 
birth certificate as a second parent in the model of Elisa B.235  Yet an 
Alabama trial court later refused to enforce the California order, leaving 
A.K. essentially without any parental rights in Alabama.236 
To this point, A.K. v. N.B. appears to embody the rationale of In re 
Adoption of K.R.S.: Alabama strictly enforces its mini-DOMA to deny 
same-sex-marital rights granted by other states.  The Alabama Court of 
Civil Appeals, however, reversed the lower court.237  The appellate court 
held that the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act238 (“PKPA”) 
required Alabama to yield to California’s jurisdiction in the case because at 
the time the California court took up the issue of A.K.’s parental status, 
N.B. had not yet established residency in Alabama.239  Over N.B.’s plainly 
stated request for a rejection of full faith and credit for child-custody 
orders, the court opined: 
[T]he PKPA does not merely apply to situations in which the 
court of a child’s home state has entered an order or 
judgment adjudicating a party’s visitation rights; rather, it 
bars courts in other states from exercising jurisdiction to 
make a custody or visitation determination during the 
pendency of proceedings in the child’s home state.240 
Here the PKPA, a 1980 federal law that predates DOMA and was 
conceived and executed without any reference to the vagaries of same-sex 
marriage, operates to enshrine same-sex partners’ rights over their 
biological or, as in A.K. v. N.B., non-biological/non-adoptive children.  
While the PKPA did not and could not direct Alabama’s courts to grant 
custody rights to A.K. under Alabama law, it nonetheless allowed A.K. to 
enforce such rights secured in California in Alabama’s courts—the 
crosspollination of civil rights contemplated by this Note.  The PKPA does 
nothing overt to foist gay marriage upon mini-DOMA states, but it does 
work to isolate a bundle of rights derived from state recognition of same-
sex relationships and ensure that those rights endure even after the parties 
have relocated to mini-DOMA states that would not have devised the 
rights in the first place. 
There is a coda to A.K. v. N.B. that gives pause to any bold declaration 
about the case: in Ex parte N.B., the Alabama Supreme Court rendered the 
                                                                                                                          
235 A.K. v. N.B., 66 So. 3d at 244–45. 
236 Id. at 246. 
237 Id. at 248. 
238 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2012) (mandating that “[f]ull faith and credit given to child custody 
determinations”); supra Part IV. 
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case moot by vacating the original juvenile-court case and Court of Civil 
Appeals reversal and quashing its own grant of certiorari.241  The supreme 
court stated that as the Alabama cases had begun with an improper ex parte 
motion by N.B., both of the lower courts’ orders had to be vacated.242  
Hence, no state supreme court decision on the merits was ever taken, and, 
as no further action has been filed, a final disposition of the state-level 
doctrine remains unknown.  The appellate court’s clear endorsement of full 
faith and credit for out-of-state child-custody orders, however, coupled 
with the supreme court’s disposal of the case on strictly procedural 
grounds, may mean marriage-equality supporters have reason to be 
optimistic that the parenting rights of same-sex partners, once established 
in marriage-equality jurisdictions, will survive within the borders of 
Alabama. 
There is very recent evidence that such optimism is not misplaced.  It 
is true that the Alabama Supreme Court sent the clear message that since a 
remarried heterosexual father could “provide [the] benefit” of a “successful 
marriage,” while a now-single mother could not if “cohabit[ing] with her 
lesbian life partner,” the father’s demands for a custody modification 
would be granted.243  Yet at the end of July 2013, the Circuit Court of 
Mobile County entered an order that appears to evade that high court’s 
strictures.  Walsh v. Hughes,244 echoing J.M.F., concerned a divorce in the 
state of Washington after which the newly single mother, Hughes, entered 
into a committed domestic partnership under that state’s laws with her 
same-sex lover.245  According to an account published by Hughes herself, 
after the ex-husband, Walsh, moved to Alabama with their four children, 
Hughes moved from Washington to Alabama with the intention of 
continuing to see the kids (in line with the terms of the couple’s 
Washington visitation order).246 
Once in Alabama, Walsh refused to allow the visits, leading to an 
incident in which Hughes attempted to see the children at their school on 
her appointed visitation day.247  School officials and local police refused to 
countenance her Washington state visitation order,248 an echo in form, if 
not in judicial substance, of the dispute in J.M.F.  Walsh then filed a 
                                                                                                                          
241 Ex parte N.B., 66 So. 3d 249, 256 (Ala. 2010). 
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243 Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (Ala. 1998). 
244 Order on Agreement, Walsh v. Hughes, No. DR-2011-500192.04 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Mobile Cnty. 
July 30, 2013). 
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motion with the local court to modify visitation and prevent Hughes from 
having unfettered contact with the children.249  Walsh’s attorney pointed to 
Hughes and her lovers’ bathing together in front of the children, displaying 
affection in front of them, and taking them to a gay-pride parade in 
requesting that future visitation be supervised and with restrictions on 
Hughes’ partner.250 
Walsh v. Hughes ended in an agreed settlement, but the contents of that 
agreement represent a stark departure from the doctrinal implications of 
J.M.F.  The Mobile Circuit Court approved a very favorable visitation 
order for Hughes, restoring her right to overnight custody of her children 
on alternate weekends and for large blocks of the summer.251  No 
restriction was placed on Hughes’ partner nor on Hughes’ interaction with 
her partner in the children’s presence; in fact, the court’s order makes no 
mention of the partner or Hughes’ sexual orientation.252  The Southern 
Poverty Law Center (SPLC), which had represented Hughes, trumpeted the 
result, declaring it was “believed to be a first in Alabama”253: an Alabama 
court had positively approved a same-sex partner’s child-custody rights 
and had done so in an order apparently not to be reviewed or struck down 
by a higher court. 
Whether the case is a first is dubious; the SPLC admits that stingy 
publishing makes it difficult to survey all Alabama custody orders,254 and 
even then, a negotiated settlement is not a high court verdict with 
precedential power.  The result does, however, suggest that the doctrine 
laid out in J.M.F. is not having an absolutely deleterious effect on the 
parental rights of gay citizens.  Both Hughes’ local attorney and the SLPC 
insist they were eager to take the case to court,255 suggesting, if true, that 
they may see in the appellate court’s holdings in J.M.F. and in A.K. v. 
N.B256 the possibility of evolution in Alabama’s strict stance against out-of-
                                                                                                                          
249 Kirby, supra note 245. 
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251 Order on Agreement at 1, Walsh v. Hughes, No. DR-2011-500192.04 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Mobile 
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state same-sex marital rights leading to in-state child-custody rights.  It is 
noteworthy that the final Order of Agreement in Walsh mandates that 
Hughes shall pay Walsh $465 per month in child support while Walsh will 
continue to insure the children through Medicaid.257  The plaintiff, and 
perhaps the court, possibly valued non-custodial parent Hughes more as a 
source of financial support than they felt affronted by her sexual 
orientation and lifestyle.  The resolution of Walsh v. Hughes may remain 
an anomaly in Alabama’s child-custody case law, but it may also be a 
harbinger. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
There have no doubt been myriad moments when marriage-equality 
supporters imagined a Brown v. Board of Education258-type victory that 
would, in one sweep, enshrine same-sex unions into America’s national 
law and culture.  Activists have every right and reason to pursue such a 
strategy.  Yet both law and culture are already being changed by the subtle 
power of family-court decisions based on existing, non-revolutionary 
common and statutory law.  Such progress is often discounted as 
incrementalism, but in the struggle for LGBT family law rights, there may 
be great persuasive power in showing that what is being asked for is not an 
exotic departure from social norms but simply a just application of existing 
social mores.  It may be precisely such subtle persuasion, built up case by 
case through state courts, that birthed Illinois’ adoption of gay marriage in 
2013.  As each new state adopts same-sex marriage, new cases derived 
from that state’s marriages may find their way to the mini-DOMA courts 
of their neighboring jurisdictions, crosspollinating marriage equality 
through parental rights and obligations.  
In the Virginia of 2014, the eight-year-old ban on same-sex marriage 
has been struck down by a federal judge as unconstitutional,259 and there 
are signs this action is welcome: public polling of Virginians now shows 
majority support for the mini-DOMA’s repeal260 while the state’s attorney 
general refused to defend the mini-DOMA in the federal case.261  In the 
most recent survey by Montana State University-Billings, a plurality of 
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Montanans supported same-sex-marriage,262 the first poll ever to record 
such a result.263  Though Alabama’s public remains unconvinced,264 the 
state’s courts display an increasing willingness to consider—and even 
endorse—the parental rights of LGBT parents.  As such local courts award 
more and more gay parents true custody rights over their children, local 
communities have ever increasing opportunities to watch those parents 
raise productive members of society.  As the awareness of same-sex 
couples as protectors and nurturers of the next generation grows, so may 
public tolerance, then public appreciation, and at last public embrace of 
LGBT marriage.  To return to the Justice Brandeis epigraph: there may 
come a day when allowing full marital status to same-sex couples will not 
be seen as a radical social experiment.  Denying it to them will. 
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